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Abstract
We study the impact of central clearing of over-the-counter (OTC)
transactions on counterparty exposures in a market with OTC trans-
actions across several asset classes with heterogeneous characteristics.
The impact of introducing a central counterparty (CCP) on expected
interdealer exposure is determined by the tradeoff between multilateral
netting across dealers on one hand and bilateral netting across asset
classes on the other hand. We find this tradeoff to be sensitive to as-
sumptions on heterogeneity of asset classes in terms of ‘riskyness’ of
the asset class as well as correlation of exposures across asset classes.
In particular, while an analysis assuming independent, homogeneous
exposures suggests that central clearing is efficient only if one has an
unrealistically high number of participants, the opposite conclusion is
reached if differences in riskyness and correlation across asset classes
are realistically taken into account. We argue that empirically plau-
sible specifications of model parameters lead to the conclusion that
central clearing does reduce interdealer exposures: the gain from mul-
tilateral netting in a CCP overweighs the loss of netting across asset
classes in bilateral netting agreements. When a CCP exists for inter-
est rate derivatives, adding a CCP for credit derivatives is shown to
decrease overall exposures. These findings are shown to be robust to
the statistical assumptions of the model as well as the choice of risk
measure used to quantify exposures.
∗Presented at the Global Derivatives Conference 2011, the 5th Financial Risks Forum:
Systemic Risk, the European Institue on Financial Regulation (Paris, 2011), the SIAM
Conference on Financial Mathematics & Engineering 2012 and the Midwest Finance As-
sociation 2013 Annual Meeting. We thank the Europlace Institute of Finance and the
Danish Council for Independent Research | Social Sciences for financial support.
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1 Central clearing of OTC derivatives
Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives represent a sizable fraction of financial
transactions worldwide, encompassing a wide variety of contracts and asset
classes. Figure 1 depicts the development in the OTC derivatives markets
for different asset classes since 1998. Although the increase in notionals has
stopped since the peak of the financial crisis the overall growth is impressive.
The contraction in some OTC derivatives asset classes since the beginning
of the crisis is clearly seen from Table 1, which shows gross notional values
in different asset classes as of June 2007 and June 2010.
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Figure 1: Notional amounts outstanding in OTC derivatives markets, in
trillions USD. Source: BIS.
Table 1: Gross notional values in OTC derivatives markets in billions as of
June 2007 and June 2010. Source: BIS
Asset Class 2007 2010
Commodity 8,255 3,273
Equity Linked 9,518 6,868
Foreign Exchange 57,604 62,933
Interest Rate 381,357 478,093
Credit Derivatives 51,095 31,416
Other 78 72
Total 507,907 582,655
Most bilateral OTC contracts involve exchange of collateral between
counterparties, to mitigate counterparty risk. However, there is evidence
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that collateral requirements in bilateral Credit Support Annexes (CSAs)
lead to non-negligible residual counterparty exposures. This is particularly
the case in credit derivatives contracts where jump-to-default risk is typi-
cally not covered by bilateral collateral requirements (Cont, 2010). In fact,
the collapse of AIG in September 2008 was triggered by CDS collateral re-
quirements it could not meet. Brigo et al. (2011) and Fujii and Takahashi
(2011) both show that even in the extreme case of continuously collateral-
ized CDS contracts, counterparty risk is present, e.g. jump-to-default risk.
Arora et al. (2012) find evidence of counterparty risk in the interdealer CDS
markets. Singh (2010) finds that most large banks active in the OTC deriva-
tives market are under-collateralized.
One of the solutions proposed for mitigating counterparty risk is the
central clearing of OTC derivatives. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 has mandated central clearing for
standardized Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives. Many classes of OTC
derivatives are already being partially cleared through Central Counterpar-
ties (CCPs), e.g. LCH Clearnet for Interest Rate Swaps (IRSs), ICE Clear
and CME for Credit Default Swaps (CDS), Fixed Income Clearing Corp
(FICC) for fixed-income OTC derivatives and many others. The volume of
OTC derivatives cleared through central counterparties will most likely in-
crease with the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and increased capital
requirements in Basel 3 for non-cleared OTC transactions.
With a CCP, a bilateral OTC derivative trade between two counter-
parties is replaced by two symmetric trades between the CCP and each
counterparty. Trading OTC derivatives through a CCP has some desirable
effects: in a bilateral market default of one entity can spread throughout
the system leading to a chain of contagious defaults (Cont et al., 2010; Iyer
and Peydro, 2011). A CCP can break this chain of contagion. It has been
argued that clearing trades through a CCP leads to a gain in multilateral
netting among market participants in the asset class being cleared, higher
transparency, risk sharing among members of the clearinghouse, no duplica-
tive monitoring, mitigation of counterparty risk as counterparties are insu-
lated from each other’s default, a reduction in commitment frictions (Nosal,
2011). Moreover, by centralizing information, supervision and transparency
for regulators are facilitated while retaining trade anonymity, and from a
moral hazard perspective it is less problematic to bail out a CCP compared
to bailing out individual banks. While a CCP leads to higher multilateral
netting it comes at the cost of reduced bilateral netting: if only a subset of
OTC contracts is cleared, netting across asset classes due to hedging is not
accounted for, e.g. if a fixed income position is hedged with an OTC interest
rate derivative, separate clearing of the derivative leads to larger collateral
requirements.
Tables 2 and 3 show the OTC derivatives notionals in four different asset
classes of the 10 largest US derivatives dealers. Inspection of the tables re-
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Table 2: Notional OTC derivative exposures for the 10 largest US derivatives
dealers, March 31, 2009 (billions USD). Source: Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency.
Dealer Forwards Options Swaps Credit
JP Morgan Chase 8,422 10,633 51,221 7,495
Bank of America 9,132 6,908 50,702 5,649
Goldman Sachs 1,631 6,754 30,958 6,601
Morgan Stanley 1,127 3,530 26,112 6,307
Citigroup 4,743 5,868 15,199 2,950
Wells Fargo 1,217 543 2,748 286
HSBC 595 185 1,565 913
Taunus 667 20 162 144
Bank of New York 371 304 404 1
State Street 571 45 24 0
Total 28,476 34,792 179,094 30,348
Table 3: Notional amounts of OTC derivatives contracts of the 10 biggest
US derivatives dealers as of December 31, 2010 in billions. Source: Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency.
Dealer Forwards Options Swaps Credit
JP Morgan Chase 11,807 8,899 49,332 5,472
Bank of America 10,287 5,848 43,482 4,367
Citigroup 6,895 7,071 28,639 2,546
Goldman Sachs 3,805 8,568 27,392 4,233
Morgan Stanley 5,459 3,855 27,162 4,648
Wells Fargo 1,081 463 1,806 93
HSBC 758 127 1,901 700
Bank of New York 420 367 555 1
Taunus 848 21 199 33
State Street 599 76 79 0
Total 41,959 35,295 180,547 22,093
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veals a decrease in the notional of the credit derivatives class between 2009
and 2010. This is primarily a consequence of increased trade compression
and the increased use of central clearing in the CDS market (Vause, 2010):
the first CDS clearing facility, operated by ICE Clear, started its operations
in 2009 and currently clears a sizable fraction of interdealer trades in index
and single name corporate CDSs. Comparing Table 3 with Table 2 suggests
that the central clearing of CDSs initiated in 2009 and the resulting com-
pression of bilateral trades led to an overall decrease of the magnitude of
dealer exposures.
To understand why central clearing of OTC trades can lead to such a
decrease in the sum of bilateral exposures, consider a stylized market of four
participants with bilateral exposures like shown in the left part of Figure 2.
In this market the sum of bilateral exposures amounts to 350, taking into
account bilateral netting. Introducing a CCP enables multilateral netting of
the exposures (Figure 2 , right) which reduces the total net exposure to 180.
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Figure 2: Left: A stylized bilateral market. Right: A centrally cleared
market.
The above example highlights the benefits of multilateral netting through
a CCP. But there are also situations where central clearing of a single asset
class may actually increase overall net exposures. If only a subset of OTC
contracts is cleared, netting across asset classes due to hedging is not ac-
counted for. For instance, if a fixed income position is hedged with an OTC
interest rate derivative, separate clearing of the derivative leads to larger
exposure, which in return leads to larger collateral requirements. A relevant
question is thus to compare the impact of these two competing effects:
• the reduction of net exposures due to multilateral netting across coun-
terparties through central clearing, and
• the increase in net bilateral exposures through the loss of netting across
asset classes.
In an influential paper widely disseminated to regulators, Duffie and Zhu
(2011) argue that if only a subset of OTC contracts is cleared in a clearing-
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house, then there may be a loss of netting across asset classes which exceeds
the gain in multilateral netting across market participants. This conclusion
has been interpreted by some to mean that ’CCPs increase net exposure’.
Contribution In the present work, we reconsider the impact of central
clearing of over-the-counter (OTC) transactions on counterparty exposures
in a market with OTC transactions across several asset classes with hetero-
geneous characteristics. We find that the impact, on total expected inter-
dealer exposure, of introducing a central counterparty for a single class of
OTC derivatives is highly sensitive to assumptions on heterogeneity of asset
classes in terms of ‘riskyness’ of the asset class as well as correlation of ex-
posures across asset classes. In particular, while a model with independent,
homogeneous exposures suggests that central clearing is efficient only if one
has an unrealistically high number of participants, these conclusions are not
robust to departures from the assumptions of independent and homogene-
ity. In fact, we find that the opposite conclusion is reached if differences in
riskyness across asset classes are realistically taken into account. Empiri-
cally plausible specifications of these parameters lead to the conclusion that
the gain from multilateral netting in a CCP overweighs the loss of netting
across asset classes in bilateral netting agreements. When a CCP exists for
interest rate derivatives, adding a CCP for credit derivatives is shown to
decrease overall exposures. This result distinguishes our study from Duffie
and Zhu (2011) where the marginal effect of clearing credit derivatives is
very limited when interest rate swaps are already being cleared. These find-
ings are shown to be robust to the choice of distribution for OTC credit
derivatives exposures.
Outline The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 introduced a stylized model of an OTC market with K different
asset classes and examines how the separate or joint clearing of one or more
asset classes in a CCP affects bilateral exposures. Section 3 emphasizes
the key role played by assumptions on heterogeneity of various parameters
–heterogeneity of riskyness across asset classes, heterogeneity of exposure
sizes across dealers– and proposed a flexible parameterization to account for
this heterogeneity.
Section 4 uses this framework to study how the introduction of CCPs
affects OTC derivatives exposures, using three different risk measures. Fi-
nally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 A stylized model of OTC clearing
To compare the impact on exposures of multilateral netting across coun-
terparties, as opposed to cross-asset netting in OTC markets with bilateral
transactions, we consider a market where N participants trade over-the-
counter derivatives in K different asset classes, labeled k = 1...K. Collateral
requirements, whether bilateral or in CCPs, are typically based on an esti-
mation of exposures over a horizon which we denote by Xkij ; the net value
of the total positions at some future time point that i owns of derivatives
belonging to asset class k with j as the counterparty. The exposure of i to
j in asset class k is then defined as
max
{
Xkij , 0
}
. (1)
We want to compare total exposures across three configurations:
1. The total exposure e0i of company i under bilateral netting (no central
clearing):
e0i =
∑
j 6=i
max
{
K∑
k=1
Xkij , 0
}
. (2)
2. The exposure e1i assuming asset class K is cleared through a central
counterparty
e1i =
∑
j 6=i
max
{
K∑
k=1
(1− wk)Xkij , 0
}
+ max
∑
j 6=i
wKX
K
ij , 0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exposure to CCP
, (3)
where wk denotes the fraction of asset class k that is being cleared.
Hence in this case we have that, wk = 0 for k = 1, ...,K − 1.
3. The exposure e2i when two asset classes K − 1 and K are separately
cleared through a central counterparty
e2i =
∑
j 6=i
max
{
K∑
k=1
(1− wk)Xkij , 0
}
+ max
∑
j 6=i
wK−1XK−1ij , 0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exposure to CCP 1
+ max
∑
j 6=i
wKX
K
ij , 0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exposure to CCP 2
, (4)
where wk = 0 for k = 1, ...,K − 2.
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In equation (2) all netting is done bilaterally across all K asset classes
and the total net exposure of dealer i is the sum of the net exposure with
each counterparty j. When a CCP is introduced in the market, as in equa-
tions (3) and (4), the total net exposure is the sum of the bilateral net
exposures to all counterparties and the exposures to the CCPs. Hence, the
introduction of clearinghouses transfers exposure reductions from bilateral
netting to multilateral netting. Whether the introduction of a clearinghouse
increases or decreases net exposures depends on the particular market, e.g.
the notional sizes of the asset classes, riskyness of the asset classes, corre-
lation between the asset classes, the number of asset classes, the number of
banks etc. In terms of dealer risk management our analysis underestimates
the risk reduction from central clearing since we put the same risk weights
on bilateral dealer exposures and exposures to a CCP. In most cases the
riskyness of a CCP will be lower than that of a dealer - and hence have a
smaller risk weight. The reader is referred to Arnsdorf (2012) for a model
to quantify the CCP risk a dealer faces when participating in a CCP.
In the sequel we consider different distributional choices for the expo-
sures, and we compare expected net exposures, Value at Risk (VaR), ex-
pected shortfall and the mean of the maximum of realized exposures across
dealers across various clearing scenarios.
3 Accounting for heterogeneity
3.1 The importance of correlation and heterogeneity in ex-
posures
The stylized model above requires assumptions on the joint distribution of
exposures.
Let us first consider the baseline case where Xkij ∼ N (0, σk) are normally
distributed for all i 6= j and allowed to be correlated across asset classes. As
in Duffie and Zhu (2011), we assume that the standard deviation of Xkij is
proportional to the credit exposure
σk = αkCEk. (5)
Table 4 shows the gross credit exposures CEk in six different asset classes
as of June 2010. OTC interest rate derivatives clearly account for the major
portion of this value.
Consider first a market where only one single asset class is being cleared.
In Duffie and Zhu (2011) it is shown that if αk = α for all k = 1, ...,K and
if the exposures are uncorrelated, the number of entities required to partic-
ipate in the central clearinghouse has to be equal to or greater than 461 in
order to see a reduction in expected exposures: this is an unrealistically high
number, so it would imply in practice that existing clearing schemes do not
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Table 4: Gross market values in OTC derivatives markets in billions as of
June 2010. Source: BIS
Asset Class Exposure
Commodity 457
Equity Linked 706
Foreign Exchange 2,524
Interest Rate 17,533
CDS 1,666
Other 1,788
Total 24,673
result in reduction of exposures. But, altering the assumption on risk per
dollar notional to e.g. αK = 3α in the same model, the picture is changed
dramatically and the threshold number drops to 54. If furthermore we as-
sume the correlation between the asset class exposures is, e.g., 10%, then
the number of clearing members needed to achieve compression of exposures
is down to... 17! Table 5 reports the required number of participants for dif-
ferent scenarios. Figure 3 depicts the minimal number of members required
to participate in the clearinghouse in order to see expected exposure reduc-
tions as a function of correlation and riskyness of the cleared asset class.
The Figure clearly reveals that the base case considered in Duffie and Zhu
(2011). ρ = 0 and αK = 1, is a singularity: a slight deviation from these
parameters alters the conclusions of the model dramatically.
Table 5: Minimal number of clearing members required in order for a CCP
to reduce expected exposure. Xkij ∼ N(0, α2kCE2k) are jointly Gaussian.
Assumptions N
Duffie & Zhu’s example:
ρ = 0, αi = α 461
ρ = 0, αK = 3α
αi = α, i < K 54
ρ = 0.1, αK = 3α
αi = α, i < K 17
ρ = 0.2, αK = 2α
αi = α, i < K 11
These observations illustrate that, even in a simple setting with (Gaus-
sian) identically distributed exposures, the tradeoff between netting across
asset classes versus multilateral netting across market participants is highly
8
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Figure 3: Minimal number of members N required to participate in the
CCP in order to see a reduction in the expected exposures as a function of
riskyness of the asset class being cleared αK and the correlation between
asset classes ρ.
sensitive to assumptions on the correlation of exposures and the heterogene-
ity of riskyness across asset classes. Conclusions based on a model with
homogeneous risk across asset classes are not robust to departures from this
homogeneity assumption.
We now introduce a model which allows to parametrize this heterogeneity
of exposure sizes across dealers and asset classes and differentiates various
asset classes in terms of their risk characteristics, as measured by the ’risk’
(or collateral requirement) per dollar notional.
3.2 Accounting for heterogeneity across dealers
Instead of credit exposures we now use notional values to determine the dis-
tribution of the Xkijs and assume that they are proportional to the notional
values via
Xkij = βkZ
k
i
Zkj∑
h6=i Z
k
h
Y kij , (6)
where Y kij is a random variable with zero mean and unit variance, and Z
k
i is
the total notional size of dealer i in asset class k. In this way the exposure
of i to j in class k is a weighted fraction of company i’s total notional in
derivatives class k, where the weight equals j’s notional size in asset class k
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relative to the total notional size of the dealers in asset class k.
3.2.1 Normally distributed exposures
We first study the case where Y kij is a standard normally distributed vari-
able. In the Gaussian case we can get closed formulas for the expected net
exposures
E
[
e0i
]
=
1√
2pi
∑
j 6=i
√√√√ K∑
k=1
K∑
m=1
ρkmβkZ
k
i
Zkj∑
h6=i Z
k
h
βmZmi
Zmj∑
h6=i Z
m
h
(7)
E
[
e1i
]
=
1√
2pi
∑
j 6=i
√√√√ K∑
k=1
K∑
m=1
(1− wk) (1− wm) ρkmβk
Zki Z
k
j∑
h6=i Z
k
h
βm
Zmi Z
m
j∑
h6=i Z
m
h
+
1√
2pi
βKwKZ
K
i
√∑
j 6=i
(
ZKj
)2
∑
h6=i Z
K
h
(8)
E
[
e2i
]
=
1√
2pi
∑
j 6=i
√√√√ K∑
k=1
K∑
m=1
(1− wk) (1− wm) ρkmβk
Zki Z
k
j∑
h6=i Z
k
h
βm
Zmi Z
m
j∑
h6=i Z
m
h
+
1√
2pi
βK−1wK−1ZK−1i
√∑
j 6=i
(
ZK−1j
)2
∑
h6=i Z
K−1
h
+
1√
2pi
βKwKZ
K
i
√∑
j 6=i
(
ZKj
)2
∑
h6=i Z
K
h
(9)
where ρkm = 1 for k = m.
We compute the Value at Risk and expected shortfalls at the 99% level
by simulation as these quantities are not available in closed form.
3.2.2 t-distributed CDS exposures
We also assume that the value of the CDS positions are given by
XKij = βKZ
K
i
ZKj∑
h6=i Z
K
h
tK3,ij , (10)
where tK3,ij is a normalized t-distribution with unit variance and 3 degrees
of freedom (Cont and Kan, 2011). The other asset classes are kept nor-
mally distributed as in equation (6). Correlation between the classes with
different distributional assumptions is introduced via a normal Copula with
correlation parameter ρ. In the case of the t-distribution the risk measures
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are not known in analytical closed form so we will use simulation in order
to compute them.
3.3 Heterogeneity of risk across asset classes
Another important feature which affects the analysis is the difference of asset
classes in terms of riskyness. For example, an interest rate swap and a CDS
with same notional and maturity typically will not lead to the the same
collateral requirements, since their risk is not considered to be identical. A
simple metric for this is the exposure per dollar notional for a given asset
class.
To obtain an estimate of this parameter for various asset classes, a sim-
ple approach is to examine the standard deviation of the historical daily
profit/loss, in terms of percentage of contract notional. For the CDS as-
set class, we estimate βK as the mean of the standard deviation of the daily
profit-loss of 5-year credit default swaps on the names constituting the CDX
NA IG HVOL series 12 in the period July 1st, 2007 to July 1st, 2009. In
the estimation the notionals of the CDSs are assumed equal to 1 and the
recovery rate equal to 0.4.
For the same period, we compute the βk for the interest rate class as the
standard deviation of the historical daily profit-loss from holding a 5-year
interest rate swap with notional of 1 and we use this estimate for all asset
classes other than the CDS class.
The estimated values are
βk = 0.0039 for interest rate swaps (11)
βK = 0.0098, for CDS (12)
i.e. the risk per dollar notional is around three times higher for the CDS
asset class.
4 Does central clearing reduce inter-dealer expo-
sures?
Using the setting described in the previous section, we now compare the
magnitude of inter-dealer exposures under different market clearing scenar-
ios:
0. No central clearinghouse.
1. One central clearinghouse for IRSs.
2. One central clearinghouse for CDSs.
3. Two central clearinghouses: one for IRSs and one for CDSs.
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4. One central clearinghouse for both IRSs and CDSs.
Given that, in each of these scenarios, the total interdealer exposure is a
random variable, we need a criterion for evaluating the magnitude of expo-
sures. Duffie and Zhu (2011) focus on the expected exposures; to check for
robustness of results with respect to this choice we have computed various
risk measures for the total interdealer exposure in each scenario:
• expected exposure
• 99% quantile of the total exposure
• 99% tail conditional expectation
These risk measures are reported below in terms of the ratio to their value
under the base scenario where no clearinghouse exists.
Currently some markets for OTC derivatives are already being cleared.
Following a meeting on January 27th, 2010 at The Federal Reserve New
York, 14 major dealers say in a letter of March 1st, 2010 that they will aim
to centrally clear wK = 85% of new and historical credit derivatives trades.
In interest rate derivatives, dealers are working to clear wK−1 = 90% of new
eligible trades.1 We will use these clearing fractions in equations (2)-(4)
when evaluating the above scenarios. In the case where one single CCP
clears both IRSs and CDSs the classes can be considered to belong to the
same class and we use equation (3)
We use the notional values reported in Table 2 and assume that there
exist 10 identical European dealers, hence the total number of participants
is 20. This is not a high number, at the time of writing the number of
participants in SwapClear at LCH Clearnet is 38.
For the case of the Gaussian CDS exposures we use the analytical for-
mulas to compute the expected exposures and 106 simulated scenarios to
compute the other two risk measures. When t-distributed exposures are
involved we approximate the three measures using 106 simulations and cor-
relate the exposures across asset classes via a Gaussian Copula.
Tables 6 and 7 report the results for the cases where the exposures are
decorrelated and correlated with ρ = 0.1, respectively. From Table 6, com-
paring the case of no central clearing in the market to the case where the
OTC interest rate swaps are cleared (columns 1, 5 and 9), we see that the
overall exposures are reduced significantly for almost all dealers and in all
risk measures. The notional positions of the dealers who have no reduction
are very small compared to the total notionals of the 10 biggest dealers.
The rows with totals report the total expected exposure of all 20 dealers
relative to the total expected exposures in the scenario 0 with no CCP. We
1The letter is available for download at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc derivatives supervisors group.html.
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Table 6: Reduction of interdealer exposures in various clearing scenarios,
relative to the base scenario without central clearing, based on OCC data
for gross notional sizes (Q1 2009), assuming independence of exposures
across asset classes. Top: normally distributed CDS exposures. Bottom:
t-distributed CDS exposures.
Expected Exposure Value at Risk Expected Shortfall
Scenario IRS CDS Two Joint IRS CDS Two Joint IRS CDS Two Joint
CCP CCP CCPs CCP CCP CCP CCPs CCP CCP CCP CCPs CCP
Gaussian CDS exposures
JP Morgan Chase 0.72 1.03 0.65 0.57 0.95 1.01 0.92 0.90 0.97 1.01 0.94 0.92
Bank of America 0.66 1.04 0.61 0.55 0.93 1.01 0.91 0.90 0.95 1.01 0.93 0.92
Goldman Sachs 0.78 1.01 0.62 0.52 0.97 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.98 1.00 0.92 0.91
Morgan Stanley 0.80 0.99 0.58 0.47 0.97 1.00 0.88 0.87 0.98 1.00 0.91 0.90
Citigroup 0.84 1.02 0.78 0.70 0.98 1.01 0.95 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.95
Wells Fargo 0.76 1.03 0.75 0.70 0.96 1.01 0.95 0.93 0.97 1.01 0.96 0.95
HSBC 1.00 0.82 0.64 0.53 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.88 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.91
Taunus 1.04 0.96 0.99 0.94 1.01 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.98
Bank of New York 0.95 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
State Street 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total 0.74 1.02 0.64 0.56
Expected Exposure Value at Risk Expected Shortfall
Scenario IRS CDS Two Joint IRS CDS Two Joint IRS CDS Two Joint
CCP CCP CCPs CCP CCP CCP CCPs CCP CCP CCP CCPs CCP
t-distributed CDS exposures
JP Morgan Chase 0.68 1.03 0.64 0.57 0.94 1.01 0.92 0.90 0.95 1.01 0.94 0.92
Bank of America 0.63 1.03 0.61 0.55 0.93 1.01 0.91 0.90 0.94 1.01 0.93 0.92
Goldman Sachs 0.72 1.02 0.62 0.53 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.96 1.00 0.92 0.91
Morgan Stanley 0.73 1.01 0.58 0.48 0.95 1.00 0.88 0.87 0.96 1.00 0.90 0.89
Citigroup 0.81 1.03 0.78 0.71 0.97 1.01 0.95 0.94 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.95
Wells Fargo 0.75 1.03 0.75 0.70 0.95 1.01 0.95 0.93 0.96 1.01 0.96 0.95
HSBC 0.95 0.89 0.68 0.57 0.99 0.96 0.89 0.88 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.89
Taunus 1.03 0.99 1.01 0.97 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.98
Bank of New York 0.95 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
State Street 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total 0.70 1.03 0.64 0.56
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Table 7: Reduction of interdealer exposures in various clearing scenarios,
relative to the base scenario without central clearing, based on OCC data
for gross notional sizes (Q1 2009), assuming correlated exposures across asset
classes with ρ = 0.1. Top: normally distributed CDS exposures. Bottom:
t-distributed CDS exposures.
Expected Exposure Value at Risk Expected Shortfall
Scenario IRS CDS Two Joint IRS CDS Two Joint IRS CDS Two Joint
CCP CCP CCPs CCP CCP CCP CCPs CCP CCP CCP CCPs CCP
Gaussian CDS exposures
JP Morgan Chase 0.71 1.00 0.63 0.56 0.94 1.00 0.91 0.90 0.96 1.00 0.93 0.92
Bank of America 0.66 1.01 0.60 0.54 0.93 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.94 1.00 0.92 0.91
Goldman Sachs 0.76 0.98 0.60 0.52 0.95 0.99 0.89 0.88 0.97 0.99 0.91 0.91
Morgan Stanley 0.77 0.96 0.56 0.47 0.96 0.98 0.88 0.87 0.97 0.99 0.90 0.90
Citigroup 0.82 0.99 0.74 0.67 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.94
Wells Fargo 0.75 1.01 0.72 0.68 0.94 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.96 1.00 0.95 0.94
HSBC 0.96 0.80 0.62 0.53 0.99 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.90
Taunus 1.02 0.94 0.95 0.91 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.97
Bank of New York 0.91 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.98
State Street 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total 0.73 0.99 0.62 0.55
Expected Exposure Value at Risk Expected Shortfall
Scenario IRS CDS Two Joint IRS CDS Two Joint IRS CDS Two Joint
CCP CCP CCPs CCP CCP CCP CCPs CCP CCP CCP CCPs CCP
t-distributed CDS exposures
JP Morgan Chase 0.68 1.01 0.63 0.57 0.93 1.00 0.91 0.90 0.94 1.00 0.92 0.92
Bank of America 0.63 1.01 0.60 0.55 0.92 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.93 1.00 0.92 0.91
Goldman Sachs 0.71 0.99 0.61 0.53 0.93 0.99 0.89 0.88 0.95 0.99 0.91 0.90
Morgan Stanley 0.71 0.98 0.56 0.48 0.94 0.99 0.88 0.87 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.89
Citigroup 0.79 1.00 0.75 0.68 0.95 0.99 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.94
Wells Fargo 0.74 1.01 0.72 0.68 0.94 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.95 1.00 0.95 0.94
HSBC 0.91 0.86 0.65 0.56 0.97 0.95 0.88 0.87 0.98 0.95 0.90 0.89
Taunus 1.01 0.96 0.97 0.93 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.97
Bank of New York 0.91 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.98
State Street 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total 0.70 1.00 0.62 0.56
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only compute the “total” for the expected exposures as the other two risk
measures are not additive.
While it is debatable whether the introduction of a clearinghouse for
CDSs will reduce exposures when there is no existing clearinghouse in the
market (columns 2, 6 and 10), the results are more definitive when the
interest rate class is already being cleared (columns 3, 7 and 11). For both
distributional choices of the CDS class, adding a CCP for the CDS class
decreases the three different risk measures. Depending on the assumptions
made, the total expected exposures are decreased with additional 6-11%
compared to the case when only interest rate swaps are cleared. In absolute
values this corresponds to reductions in the order of USD 41-76 billions in
total expected net exposure.
In the case where a single CCP clears both IRSs and CDSs the net expo-
sure reductions are higher since multilateral netting is possible across both
types of derivatives classes. We also note that the difference in exposure
reductions between scenarios 1) and 3) are bigger than the difference be-
tween scenarios 3) and 4), and especially for the risk measures VaR and
expected shortfall. Hence, the decision to clear the CDS asset class is the
most important, whether it is done by the same CCP that clears IRSs or
not.
As expected, the results reported in Table 7 confirm that in the presence
of positive asset class correlation, introduction of central clearinghouses in-
creases the benefit from clearing compared to the zero correlation case. All
the fractions are slightly smaller with a correlation parameter of ρ = 0.1.
When the asset classes are positively correlated the exposure reductions due
to bilateral netting across classes are reduced.
Interestingly, we note that using t-distributed CDS exposures instead of
Gaussian exposures does not change the conclusions.
For the different scenarios, Table 8 reports the average of the maximum
realized net exposure across dealers, which can be interpreted as a worst
case measure of dealer exposure. Yet again we observe that scenarios 1),3),
and 4) result in significant exposure reductions.
Table 8: Average of the maximum exposure across counterparties in the five
scenarios and for the four different exposure specifications. All the numbers
are in millions.
Scenario Bilateral IRS CDS Two Joint
CCP CCP CCPs CCP
Gaussian CDS, ρ = 0 136,460 114,340 138,830 108,110 103,190
Gaussian CDS, ρ = 0.1 145,040 120,440 144,850 113,130 109,160
t-distributed CDS, ρ = 0 136,020 111,630 138,480 107,770 103,070
t-distributed CDS, ρ = 0.1 144,140 117,500 144,370 112,650 108,820
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For the different clearinghouse scenarios, Figure 4 depicts the histograms
of the reduction in exposures across counterparties
ni = e
0
i − eni , (13)
where n = 1, ..., 4 corresponds to the clearing scenario, in a market with
20 participants and independent Gaussian exposures. Positive values corre-
spond to cases where central clearing reduces the exposure. Hence, scenarios
1),3), and 4) are generally giving rise to positive reductions in exposures. In
particular it is observed how the CDS clearing scenarios 3) and 4) signifi-
cantly reduce the tail of the distribution of differences compared to scenario
1) where only IRS are cleared.
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Figure 4: Histograms of the simulated differences (13) in the Gaussian CDS
exposure zero correlation specification. Here all the exposure differences of
the CCP participants are bundled together in a single vector.
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5 Conclusion
Using a stylized model of OTC exposures with multiple asset classes, we
have compared the effects of bilateral netting across classes with those of
multilateral netting across counterparties as allowed in a CCP. We find that
the impact, on total expected exposure, of introducing a central clearing fa-
cility for a given class of OTC derivatives is highly sensitive to assumptions
of heterogeneity across asset classes in terms of ’riskyness’ , as measured by
the exposure per dollar notional, as well as correlation of exposures across
asset classes. The base example (IID, homogeneous Gaussian exposures)
previously considered by Duffie and Zhu (2011) suggested that CCPs are
inefficient in reducing exposures unless one has an unrealistically high num-
ber of participants, but the opposite conclusion is reached if plausible model
parameters are used to take into account differences in riskyness across asset
classes. A second finding is that, when a CCP already exists for interest rate
swaps, clearing of credit derivatives decreases exposures whether it is done
by a new CCP or by the same CCP clearing IRSs. This result distinguishes
our study from Duffie and Zhu (2011) where the marginal effect of clear-
ing credit derivatives is very limited when interest rate swaps are already
cleared. The findings are robust to distributional assumptions on (CDS)
exposures.
We find, as in Duffie and Zhu (2011), that the exposure reduction is
highest if one CCP clears all asset classes. However, this scenario would lead
to a high concentration of systemic risk in the clearinghouse and also expose
it to a high level of operational risk, since simultaneous clearing of different
asset classes requires a more sophisticated risk management technique. A
serious examination of the benefits and drawbacks of having multiple CCPs
cannot be done solely based on expected exposures and requires a model
where systemic risk can be quantified as part of the tradeoff.
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